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Abstract 
Life-cycle models of labor supply predict a positive relationship between 
hours supplied and transitory changes in wages because such changes have vir­
tually no effect on life-cycle wealth. Previous attempts to test this hypothesis 
empirically with time-series data have not been supportive; estimated elas­
ticities are typically negative or nonsignificant. Such analyses, however, are 
vulnerable to measurement error and other estimation problems. We use data 
on daily observations of wages and hours for New York City cab drivers to 
estimate the supply response to transitory fluctuations in wages. Cab drivers 
decide daily how many hours to supply, and face wages that are positively cor­
related within days, but largely uncorrelated between days. Using these data, 
our central finding is that wage elasticities are persistently negative - from 
-.5 to -1 in three different samples - even after correcting for measurement
error using instrumental variables. These negative wage elasticities challenge 
the notion that cab drivers trade off labor and leisure at different points in 
time and question the empirical adequacy of life-cycle formulations of labor 
supply. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Dynamic models that permit intertemporal substitution of labor and leisure have been an 
important development in the study of labor supply . First proposed by Robert Lucas and Leonard 
Rapping (1969) to account for the observed positive correlation between output and employment, 
such models are more difficult to estimate than traditional static formulations, because they require 
time-series data to estimate and because they require many auxiliary assumptions about how 
economic agents form expectations of future wages, interest rates ,  and even tastes .  This added 
complexity introduces new potential for specification error and reduces the power of the empirical 
estimates by adding parameters . 
Given these disadvantages, dynamic models can be justified if they provide a more realistic 
view of how people actually make labor supply decisions. But there are at least two reasons to doubt 
that the models do. 
Doubts about intertemporal substitution 
First, many empirical tests of dynamic models have not supported the assumption that people 
make tradeoffs between labor and leisure at different points in time. In tests of dynamic models ,  using 
aggregate (Gregory Mankiw, Julio Rotemberg & Lawrence Summers, 1985) ,  cohort (Martin
Browning, Angus Deaton & Margaret Irish, 1985), and panel (Joseph Altonji ,  1986) data, estimated
elasticities of intertemporal substitution have been generally low and nonsignificant, or even negative 
(but see Casey Mulligan, 1995). As John Pencavel notes, "as often as not, the null hypothesis that 
life-cycle changes in wages have no effect on hours worked by prime-aged men cannot be rejected 
at conventional levels of significance" (1986:92). 
Second, the assumption that people make difficult tradeoffs between labor and leisure at 
different points in time is at odds with evidence from studies of decision making which show that the 
time horizon over which most people maximize is typically short (e.g . ,  Eric Johnson et al, 1996; 
Daniel Read and George Loewenstein, 1995). At best, the empirical validity of the planning 
assumptions underlying the dynamic labor supply formulations remains to be demonstrated. 
Despite the flexibility of dynamic formulations of labor supply (because of the large numbers 
of parameters allowed) , such models make at least one clear prediction: hours supplied should be 
positively related to transitory (e .g . ,  daily) fluctuations in wages (e .g . ,  Thomas MaCurdy, 
1981 :1074). In a multi-period maximization problem, a transitory wage change will have a trivial 
impact on life-cycle wealth, so the implied wealth-effect of such a change is very small. Since the 
substitution effect is assumed to be positive, an increase in the transitory wage should induce an 
increase in labor supply. 
The logic of the argument is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the expected labor supply
response to a transitory change in the daily wage of a worker whose utility is an additive exponential 
function of consumption and leisure. The figure shows that for time horizons of two or more days,  
the implied wealth effect of a one-day wage change is small, and substitution of hours into work 
causes the labor supply curve to become upward sloping. But for the parameter values we selected, 
over a one-day time horizon the wealth effect of a wage increase dominates the substitution effect 
and labor supply is strongly downward-sloping. 
The labor supply response to a transitory change in wage thus provides a strong test of the 
dynamic formulation of labor supply because a rejection of this prediction would cast significant 
doubt on the validity of the model (rather than simply rejecting specific assumptions about functional 
forms or separabilities) . However, this prediction has been difficult to test because the wage-changes 
observed in existing data sets are usually not purely transitory . Changes in wages usually apply for 
relatively long periods, changes are often serially correlated, and nominal wages are typically sticky 
downwards. Given the distinctly non-transitory nature of changes in wages, it has been very difficult, 
in practice, to estimate the labor supply response to such changes .  
Testing intertemporal substitution with data from cab drivers 
As we show below, there is at least one group of workers ,  who do experience highly 
transitory changes in wages:  taxi cab drivers . Due primarily to demand shocks (such as rain and 
conventions in their city), cab drivers face wage-rates that are highly correlated within a day,  but 
largely uncorrelated across days.  We take advantage of these features to test whether labor supply 
responds positively to transitory changes,  by estimating wage elasticities for New York City cab 
drivers using daily observations of wages and hours . Besides permitting a clean test of labor supply 
response to transitory changes in wages ,  our data avoid some other problems that have limited 
previous research on labor supply. 
First, unlike most people, cab drivers make a relatively unconstrained choice of the number 
of hours to work each day. Most cab drivers rent their cabs from a fleet for a fixed fee and drive their 
cabs as long as they like during a continuous 12-hour shift. At the end of their shifts, drivers pay their 
daily lease fee and pocket the cash that remains.  The drivers' flexibility in deciding when to quit 
provides substantial variation in hours . 
Second, most analyses of labor supply measure hours by self-reports (which may be subject 
to poor memory or reporting biases) . For cab drivers, more objective measures of hours worked and 
income earned are available. Each "trip" (time and location picked up and dropped off, and the fare 
collected) is recorded on a "trip sheet" filled out by the driver. In addition, the meters used in NYC 
cabs automatically record the number of trips and the fare for each trip . This meter output gives a 
precise measure of total daily income (excluding tips) and also can be used to check the validity of 
the trip sheets, on which hours driven are recorded, helping to reduce noise in the data. 
Third, in most empirical analyses of labor supply, annual hours have been regressed on hourly 
wage, but the hourly wage is calculated by dividing yearly income by annual hours . Measurement 
error in annual hours will produce a negative spurious correlation between hours and wages .  
Instrumental variables can be used, but it  is often difficult to find suitable instruments .  The same 
problem also applies to cab drivers , but in this case a simple and effective instrument is available -­
the wage rates of other cab-drivers who face similar demand shocks on any given day and shift. 
Using these data, our central finding is that wage elasticities are persistently and significantly 
negative, around - .5. That is, work hours fall about half as much (in percentage terms) as wages rise. 
When the other-driver wage is used as an instrument, the elasticities become even more negative, 
often close to -1. 
Thus, our data present a challenge to the notion that cab drivers are making intertemporal 
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tradeoffs of labor and leisure across days. Given that cab drivers seem to make relatively myopic labor 
supply decisions, our data allow us to evaluate some alternative theories that predict downward 
sloping labor supply curves .  Since elasticities are negative for wealthier drivers who own their cab 
medallions, liquidity constraint is not plausible as an explanation. Other theories posit complicated 
within-day autocorrelation or various misspecifications, but these alternatives can either be easily 
rejected, or cannot readily explain why elasticities for more experienced drivers are significantly closer 
to zero in two of three samples .  
The explanation which fits best is that drivers take a short horizon, perhaps one day, and also 
care about income relative to some daily "income target" or reference point. (Similar theoretical 
ingredients were used by Shlomo Benartzi and Richard Thaler (1995) to explain the "equity premium 
puzzle " . )  If the marginal utility of income drops when they reach their target, the sensitivity to a 
target creates an exaggerated income effect and large negative elasticities .  The short-horizon theory 
accounts for the increase of elasticity with driver experience by supposing that as drivers gain 
experience, they learn to take a longer horizon and care less about each day's target, so their labor 
supply curves move upward. 
If we can generalize from the special sample of cab drivers to other workers, any group of 
free-lance workers who are likely to have a natural short-term target, have flexible work hours, and 
face daily wage variation might have downward-sloping labor supply curves.  Charter-fishing boats 
often spend long hours waiting for each passenger to catch at least one fish. Some evidence indicates 
that African farmers income-target so that an increase in the wage rate leads to a decline in hours 
worked (Berg, 1961; Orde-Browne, 1946) . Wales (1973) finds substantial negative wage elasticities 
among self-employed proprietors . The results from cab drivers suggest that further studies of these 
kinds of occupations are worthwhile. 
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
New York City cab drivers fill out daily "trip sheets " that record the times and locations at 
which passengers are picked up and dropped off, and the fares they collect. Since many trip sheets 
are incomplete1, we can check trip sheet records against a more reliable source of data: the meters 
installed in cabs. The meters used in NYC cabs automatically record the number of trips (or "drops" ,  
which establish the $1.50 base fare), the number of "live" miles driven while the meter i s  running, and 
the number of fare units (1/5 mile increments or 75 second waiting periods , each worth $ .25) . 
Almost all drivers, even those who get the lowest marks for filling out trip sheets poorly, "punch out" 
by printing a summary of their "out" (starting) and "in" (ending) drops, live miles, and fare units.  The 
meter then provides a clear measure of how many miles the driver drove, and the total fares they 
earned .  2 These can be used to check the general validity of the drivers' trip sheets, on which their 
1 Drivers do not have strong incentives to fill out trip sheets conscientiously and many of 
the sheets are incomplete (or illegible) . Fortunately, we can screen sheets for accuracy by 
comparing the number of trips and fares reported with the meter totals .  
2 We assume tips are a fixed percentage of total fares. Since drivers make about 30 trips a 
day, and tips are probably independent, the law of large numbers gives some theoretical 
underpinning for this assumption. 
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hours are recorded. We use this information to screen out implausible trip sheets . 
Our data consist of three samples of trip sheets. The first data set, TRIP, is 192 trip sheets 
borrowed from a NYC fleet company and xeroxed. The TRIP data only contain metered output for 
the total number of trips each driver takes.  Some trip sheets record many fewer trips taken than 
recorded by the meter. Therefore, we use a screen that excludes trip sheets that have more than two 
fewer trips listed than recorded on the meter. This leaves us 70 trip sheets .  This sample covers 13 
drivers and 21 days (4/2411994 to 511411994) . The main advantage of this sample is that we can 
calculate the trip-by-trip earnings profile on each driver-day and use it to measure the autocorrelation 
in hourly earnings, to see whether hourly wages are positively correlated within days and uncorrelated 
across days (i .e . ,  transitory) .  
Our second and third data sets were obtained from the New York City Taxi and Limousine 
Commission (TLC).3 The TLC periodically samples trip sheets to satisfy various demands for 
information about drivers (e.g . ,  when rate increases are proposed). In these two data sets, metered 
totals for number of trips, fares, and miles driven are available. 
The second data set, TLC l ,  is a summary of 1719 completed trip sheets from 752 drivers for 
driving days 10/111990 to 12/02/1990. We discard trip sheets that contain missing information and 
then use a screen (described in the appendix) used by the TLC in their own studies. This screened 
sample contains 1065 trips sheets from 484 drivers . The main advantage of this sample is that it 
includes several observations for each of many drivers .  
The third data set, TLC2, summarize 750 completed trip sheets from November 1988 sampled 
by the NY State Department of Transportation for a study commissioned by the TLC. We call this 
data set TLC2. The main difference from TLC l is that no drivers appear more than once in the data. 
We discard trip sheets that contain missing information and then use a screen (described in the 
appendix) used by the TLC in their own studies,  leaving us 712 trip sheets . 
Sample characteristics 
Table 1 shows means, medians, and standard deviations of the key variables we use in our 
analysis . Cab drivers work about 9.5 hours per day and collect approximately $16 per hour in 
revenues (excluding tips ,  which we cannot measure) . There is, however, substantial wage data 
variation across days .  For example, in the TRIP data set, the median hourly wage for a day ranges 
from a low of $ 14 .62 to a high of $19.87. 
Table 2 shows hour-wage observations organized into 2x2 tables for each of the three data 
sets. Cab-days are divided into those with work hours above and below the sample median (high and 
low hours) , and those with wages above and below the median (high and low wage) . The standard 
theory predicts more observations in the diagonal low wage/low hours and high wage/high hours 
cells .  The results in the table do not provide evidence consistent with the standard theory; more 
observations lie in the off-diagonal cells than the on-diagonal cells. 
In the empirical analyses below, we estimate labor supply curves using the daily number of 
hours as the dependent variable and the average wage the driver faced during that day as the 
independent variable (both in log form) . The average wage is calculated by dividing daily total 
3 See NYTLC (1991 & 1992) for descriptive analyses of the NYC taxi business based on 
these data sets . 
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revenue (calculated from the meter information) by daily hours (from the trip sheets) .4 This however, 
assumes that the decision the driver makes regarding when to stop driving depends on the average 
wage during the day,  rather than fluctuations of the wage rate during the day. 
Fluctuations could be important because negatively-autocorrelated wage rates would lead 
drivers who are actually driving according to predictions of the standard theory behave as if they were 
violating the standard theory. If autocorrelation is negative, on a day with a high wage early in the 
day drivers will quit early because they expect high hourly wages to be followed by low-wage hours . 
Conversely, on a day with low early wages drivers will drive long hours expecting the wage to rise. 
If hourly autocorrelations are zero or positive, we can rule out this alternative explanation. 
To investigate how the hourly rate varied within the day, we used the disaggregated data in 
TRIP. This data set contains accountings of all trips (miles, time, fares collected) drivers take during 
the day. We used this data to investigate the relationship between the wage rate in a particular hour, 
t, and the wage rate in previous hour, t-1 . Our analysis suggests that wages are positively serially 
correlated-- that is, if the wage rate is high one hour, on average it will continue to be high in the next 
hour. 
To study the daily persistence of wages, days were broken into hours and the median hourly 
wage for all drivers during that day and hour were calculated. We then regressed the median hourly 
wage (across drivers driving that hour) on the previous hour's median wage, yielding an estimated 
first-order autocorrelation of .493 (se=.092) . The second-order autocorrelation is even higher ( .578), 
and the third and fourth-order autocorrelations are also positive and significant. When hourly wage 
is regressed on two previous lags, the coefficients are .424 (se=.103) and .447 (se=.115). If we 
divide days into first and second halves, the correlation between median wages in the two halves is 
.40 (p= .15)5• These patterns imply that when a day starts out as a high wage day, it will likely 
continue to be a high wage day. 
Wages are virtually uncorrelated across days. When we ran regressions of the mean or 
median wage on day t on the mean or median wage on day t-1, the regression coefficient was - .07 
and insignificant (p>.7) . Wages seem to be virtually uncorrelated across days, but surprisingly stable 
within days, which is ideal for calculating the labor supply response to a transitory change in wage. 
Wage elasticities 
To estimate wage elasticities we ran the OLS regression of log hours against log wage 
(estimating daily wage with the drivers' average hourly wage from that day) .  Table 3 summarizes 
results from several analyses of the three data sets . TRIP and TLC l also include multiple 
observations on many drivers, so we also included driver fixed effects .6 To capture effects that might 
4 This is similar to the method traditionally used in the labor supply literature -- dividing 
yearly (or monthly) income by yearly (or monthly) hours to get the wage rate. 
5 While this p value is higher than conventional levels, note that the sample size for this 
correlation is only 14 (because each observation is a day).  
6 The fixed effects control for the possibility that drivers vary systematically in their work 
hours or their income target (see section Ill) ,  independent of the wage. We do not have enough 
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change the marginal utility of labor, shifting the labor supply curve, we also included measures of the 
weather such as rain (if there is variation in the sample) and the high temperature for the day ,  and 
dummy variables for the drivers' shift and for a weekday (as opposed to a weekend) , as explanatory 
variables. 
In TRIP, elasticities depend substantially on whether or not driver fixed effects are included 
in the model. When they are excluded, the estimated wage elasticity is - .41 and is significantly 
different from zero. Including fixed effects (which are jointly significant) lowers the estimated 
elasticity to -.19, which is no longer significantly different from zero. 
In the TLC l and TLC2 samples,  elasticities are strongly negative, more precisely estimated, 
and quite robust to sample and fixed effects (the estimates range from -.355 to - .641) .  There is no 
systematic evidence that elasticities are positive and the evidence for elasticity around - .5 is consistent 
across samples and specifications.7 
Figure 2 shows scatterplots of wages and hours (both on log scales) for the three samples. 
In all three plots the negative relation between wages and hours is roughly apparent. The plots also 
show that the negative elasticity estimates are not particularly influenced by outliers. 
Controlling for driver-specific measurement error 
Measurement error is a pervasive concern in studies of labor supply. Though the data on 
hours come from trip sheets rather than from memory, they may include recording errors. The 
income data also do not include tips. Measurement error in hours can lead to predictable biases in 
the estimation of wage elasticities : Since the average hourly wage is computed by dividing daily 
income by reported hours, inflated hours will produce high hours-low wage observations and deflated 
hours will produce low hours-high wage observations, creating spurious negative elasticities. On the 
other hand, measurement error in income (due to, for example, the omission of tips) will cause the 
wage elasticity to be biased towards zero.8 These two biases will either work in the same direction 
or in opposite directions, depending on whether the true wage elasticity is positive or negative. If it 
is positive, measurement error (of both kinds) will predict the estimated wage elasticity to be too 
small. However, if the true elasticity is negative, measurement error in hours will make the estimated 
elasticity too small (too negative) while measurement error in income will make the estimated 
elasticity too big (less negative). 
observations per driver to allow drivers' elasticities to vary (though individual driver estimates 
from the TRIP sample, where we do have some drivers with enough daily observation, suggest 
most elasticities are negative) 
7 Median regression and Huber-weighted regression analyses suggest our results are not sensitive 
to outliers. 
8 Sherwin Rosen pointed out that on some high-demand days, frustrated passengers searching 
for cabs might add voluntary surcharges (e.g., waving money at cab drivers). If so, then our 
highest hourly wages are understated and the true elasticity is even more negative than we 
estimate it to be. 
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To control for measurement error, we use as an instrument for own wage, the median wage 
rate of other drivers driving at the same time and day.9• Table 4 reports estimated wage elasticities, 
using the other-driver median wage as an instrument and including the other variables as regressors . 
The elasticities are less precisely estimated than in Table 3. However, the estimated wage elasticities 
are even more negative and again significantly different from zero in all but one case. 
The bottom panel of Table 4 reports the first stage regression of driver wage on the median 
wage of other drivers (on that day and shift) , which measures the quality of the other-driver wage as 
an instrument . The R2's are modest but the slope coefficients are close to one (as expected) and 
estimated with some precision. 
The fact that some of the IV estimates in Table 4 are more negative than the original estimates 
in Table 3 (particularly TLC l without fixed effects, and TLC2) is surprising. One possibility is that 
measurement error in daily income biased the original (non-IV) estimates toward zero, and the IV 
estimates are closer to the true coefficients . (The income measure omits tips and theft, so there is 
some measurement error in income, but it is probably no more than 10% of daily income on average.) 
A related possibility is that the median of several drivers' wages on day t is a more reliable estimate 
of the daily wage than any one driver's wage. 
How do elasticities vary with experience? 
Drivers may learn over time that driving more on high wage days and less on low wage days 
provides more income and more leisure. If so, the labor supply curve of experienced drivers may 
have a more positive wage elasticity than that of inexperienced drivers . 
There is a very good measure of driver experience in these data sets . Cab driver licenses are 
issued with six-digit numbers (called hack numbers), in chronological order, so lower numbers 
correspond to more experienced drivers. Of course, this is not a perfect measure of experience 
because some drivers with old licenses have been driving only sporadically . However, licenses must 
be renewed each year, and are costly to maintain, so sufficiently inactive drivers probably let their 
licenses expire. Using their license numbers, we can divide drivers into low- and high-experience 
subsamples and estimate the labor supply curves separately . 10 
9 In an earlier version of this paper, we used the median wage of other drivers on the same day 
as an instrument for own wage, which sometimes produced very large, imprecisely estimated 
elasticities . The current version using the wages of other drivers on the same day and shift. In 
addition, we ran regressions using the weather and shift variables as instruments (including them 
in the first stage regression with own-wage as the dependent variable) rather than as regressors . 
The results were very similar. 
10 We divide the three samples into low and high experience subsets using different 
methods. For the TRIP data, we divide the driversinto low and high experience drivers using a 
median split. The discrepancy in the number of observations in the two halves is due to the fact 
that we have more observations, on average, for the more experienced drivers . The other two 
data sets were divided into low and high experience groups using categories developed by the 
TLC. For TLC 1, the categories developed by TLC are before (and including) 1986 and after 
1986. For TLC2, the groups consist of those who obtained their licenses in or before 1984, and 
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Table Sa shows results from the TRIP and TLC2 samples . In the TRIP sample, the wage 
elasticities are negative and significantly different from zero for the low experienced group. For the 
high experienced group, the elasticities are indistinguishable from zero. Figure 3 shows the data and 
estimated labor supply curves for the two experience groups in the TRIP sample. An F test shows 
that the groups' elasticities are significantly different. 
In the TLC2 sample, the elasticities for the low and high experienced groups are both negative 
and significantly different from zero. The elasticity for the low experienced group is significantly more 
negative than the elasticity for the high experienced group. 
Table Sb shows estimates from the TLC 1 sample of wage elasticity for drivers with low and 
high experience levels .  The elasticities are similar for the two groups ,  with a marginally significant 
tendency for elasticities to become more negative with experience when fixed effects are included. 
We have no good explanation for the discrepancy between this result and those in Table Sa. 
Tables 6a-b show experience-based elasticities using median other-driver wage as an 
instrument. The results parallel those using own-wage in Tables Sa-b : For the TRIP and TLC2 
samples ,  more experienced drivers have substantially higher (less negative, or positive) elasticities .  
Note that the TLC l data now show a positive effect of experience when fixed effects are included, 
consistent with the other samples . 
Across the three samples we can generally reject the hypothesis that low-experience drivers 
have zero elasticity, but cannot reject the same hypothesis for high-experience drivers (except for 
TLC l without fixed effects) . In addition, in all cases we can not reject the hypothesis that low­
experience drivers have elasticities of - 1. 
How do elasticities vary with ownership? 
The way drivers pay for their cabs might affect their responsiveness of hours to wages if, for 
example, the payment scheme affects the horizon over which they plan. The TLC 1 sample contains 
data from three types of cabs -- fleets, leases, and individual-owned. Fleet cabs are rented daily and 
constitute about 6S% of the drivers in the sample. Leased cabs are rented for slightly longer terms, 
weekly or (more often) monthly. About 20% of the drivers in our sample lease cabs. Individual­
owned cabs are owned by the individuals who drive them (and often mortgaged)--about 14% of the 
drivers in our sample. 
Table 7 presents elasticity estimates in the three payment categories, with and without fixed 
effects. There are modest differences in the wage elasticities across payment categories (especially 
for the fixed effects estimates) . The largest negative wage elasticity is for the drivers who own their 
cabs and the smallest negative wage elasticities for the drivers who rent their cab on a daily basis 
( "fleet") . 1 1  Instrumental variable estimates in Table 8 show similar results , but the estimates are very 
imprecise. 
those who obtained their licenses in 198S or later . 
11 One possible explanation for this pattern is that fleet drivers are constrained to work no 
more than 12 hours. This causes the regression line for the fleet regression to be flatter. 
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III. WHY IS LABOR SUPPLY DOWNWARD-SLOPING? 
Dynamic theories of labor supply predict a positive labor supply response to transitory 
fluctuations in wages.  However, previous studies have not been able to measure this elasticity 
precisely, and the measured sign is often negative, contradicting the theoretical prediction. These 
analyses, however, have been plagued by a wide variety of estimation problems -- most notably the 
absence of direct measures of many key variables such as future wage expectations. We avoid many 
of these estimation problems by estimating labor supply functions for taxi drivers, a subset of the 
population who face wages that are highly correlated within days, but not correlated between days .  
Despite the major difference in methodology, our results lend further support to the frequent finding 
of negative elasticities for transient changes in wages. In all three of our samples, wage elasticities 
are negative and significantly different from zero. When we use instrumental variables to correct for 
measurement error in wages,  the estimated wage elasticity becomes more negative. Moreover, 
experienced drivers seem to have elasticities much closer to zero, as if they gradually shift their 
behavior to conform to the standard theory . Our results should therefore reinforce existing doubts 
about the importance of long-term intertemporal substitution of labor and leisure for labor supply. 
Alternative explanations 
Several alternative explanations for negative wage elasticities may spring to mind. Some of 
these explanations can not be tested with our data, but the testable ones can be rejected. An 
important fact for distinguishing these explanations is that experienced drivers show substantially less 
negative elasticities (around zero) than inexperienced ones.  Any explanation of why negative 
elasticities are actually rational must then explain why experienced drivers, who have less negative 
elasticities, behave less rationally than inexperienced drivers . 
Liquidity constraints 
Negative elasticities could occur if cab drivers face strongly binding liquidity constraints . The 
argument is that drivers need to drive long hours on bad days because they must pay their daily lease 
fee (and pay for gas) in cash, but lack the savings or credit to pay for these expenses except out of 
the current-day's earnings . This account seems implausible on several grounds .  Even on low wage 
days the cash required to pay the lease fee is earned rather quickly. Drivers can pay the daily lease 
fee in about five hours of driving but very few end their shifts that early . An informal credit market 
operates among cab drivers , many of whom know each other and often have strong social or ethnic 
ties .  Borrowing a small sum to pay the lease fee is not difficult for most drivers . 
A standard indirect test for liquidity constraint is to divide samples into low- and high-wealth 
people and see if they behave differently. A natural measure of wealth is present in our data-­
medallion ownership. At the time the data were generated, cab medallions were worth about 
$130,000, so owner-drivers have substantially more wealth (or borrowing power) than nonowners . 
If daily liquidity constraints are responsible for the negative wage elasticities, drivers who rent their 
cabs daily (fleet) or lease will have the most negative elasticities ,  and drivers who own their cabs will 
have the least negative, or even positive, elasticities. But the empirical results in Tables 7 and 8 show 
that the elasticities are about equally negative for all types of drivers . (In fact, owner drivers have the 
most negatively sloped labor supply curves.) 
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Taxes and nonlinear budget constraints 
In standard models of labor supply, the substitution of hours from leisure into work, as wages 
rise, is strictly positive if leisure-income indifference curves are differentiable and budget constraints 
are linear. Progressive income taxes (among other possibilities) make budget constraints nonlinear; 
the after-tax wage falls when more income pushes a worker into a higher tax bracket. If budget 
constraints are nonlinear, the substitution effect could be strictly zero, so any income effect will lead 
to downward-sloping labor supply. 
The effect of progressive taxation is surely small. The average cab driver earned around 
$22,000/year at the time the data were collected; taxes are not very progressive at that income level . 
And, even if the substitution effect is zero for many drivers, on many days, the income effect from 
transitory (daily) wage changes should be tiny if drivers take a long horizon, so labor supply will slope 
slightly downward at best. There is also no convincing reason why tax effects would be more 
substantial for inexperienced drivers than for experienced drivers. 
Controlling for self-administered work breaks 
The trip sheets used to measure work hours do not clearly distinguish between idle time spent 
searching for fares, and conscious breaks which might be considered leisure. It is conceivable that 
if we could subtract these leisure breaks from hours worked, the wage elasticity would become more 
positive. If drivers are taking lots of breaks on low-wage days, for example, that could explain why 
they appear to work longer hours on those days than on high-wage days. 
There are two reasons to doubt whether proper control for self-administered breaks would 
change our results substantially . First, in the TRIP sample we did remove breaks of more than 30 
minutes when calculating hours. The elasticities in that sample are negative, and are not substantially 
different than in the other two samples. Second, a simple model in which the percentage of break 
time depends linearly on the wage shows that if breaks are like leisure consumed in small chunks, and 
respond to wages the same way that overall leisure does, then12 failing to adjust for breaks will never 
make the measured elasticity negative when the true elasticity is positive. Elasticities cannot be 
negative just because we failed to adjust for short breaks. 
Sample Selection Bias 
12 Denote true work hours (excluding breaks) by h, measured hours by hm and h=hm(l-a-cw) 
where a+cw, between 0 and 1,  is the fraction of measured hours spent on breaks. The constant c 
measures the responsiveness of the break fraction to wages. Now suppose the true wage elasticity 
of hours (excluding breaks) is ew, so log(h)=h0+ewlog(w) . Substituting and differentiating with 
respect to w gives (dhm/dw)(w/hm)=em=ew+ cw/(1-a-cw) . That is, the measured-hours elasticity, 
em is the true (break-adjusted) hours elasticity ew plus a bias term cw/(1-a-cw) . 
If c<O-- drivers take more breaks when the wage is low-- then not adjusting for breaks does 
appear to bias the estimated elasticity downward (em <ew) . If breaks respond to wages as leisure 
does, then the change in total break time per unit change in wage, which is d[hm,a+cw)]/dw, 
should equal dL/dw. Assuming L=24-hm (as is standard) , dL/dw=-dhm/dw. Equating the break 
and leisure derivatives, gives chm+(dhm /dw)(a+cw)=-(d hmdw) . Some algebra shows that the 
bias term, cw/(1-a-cw) , equals -em; so ew =2em. Thus, if breaks are like leisure, the signs of the 
measured-hours elasticity and the true (break-adjusted) elasticity are always the same. 
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A potential problem with the hours equation is that it is estimated using days in which cab 
drivers worked positive hours . If unobserved factors affected their participation as well as hours 
decisions, the coefficient on our wage elasticity will be biased (Heckman, 1979). To see this,  write 
participation as : 
if 
Pit = 0 else 
We note that the hours equation is conditional on participation, 
Hit = wite + 0i + eit if Pit = 1 
= po/ ... it 
where p is the correlation of Eit and u when they have a bivariate normal distribution. We can rewrite 
the hours equations as 
where vit is white noise. The selection correction term, 
cp 
wits + Yi 
a 
)\_it = u wits + Yi ct> 
a 
u 
depends on wage, so its omission will bias the coefficient on wage if the error terms in participation 
are correlated. Because wage and the selection term are negative correlated, the sign of the bias will 
be opposite of the sign of the correlation between the error terms. 
Including driver fixed effects mitigates the selection problem somewhat. Then, fixed driver 
characteristics (such as being industrious) will be accounted for, and not included in the wage 
equation's error term Furthermore, if drivers are on fixed schedules, then participation on any given 
day is deterministic and our hours equation will not suffer from selection bias .  
Our data do not permit an adequate test of sample selection bias, but some analyses can be 
done. The TRIP sample consists of trip sheets collected from one company that leases cabs to many 
drivers, and includes 27 different drivers over a 19-day period. We can approximate fluctuations in 
participation across days by counting what fraction of the 27 appear in our sample on each day. (This 
fraction varies from 18.5% to 48%.)  Participation, measured this way, is uncorrelated with median 
wage (estimated p =.006, p=.46) . 
Alternatively, assume that when a driver does not appear in the TRIP sample on a given day, 
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he did not participate. Then we have a panel of 27 drivers over 19 days. A probit regression of 
participation on median wage and other variables shows no effect of median wage CP=-.235, p=.56) , 
even using the 13 drivers who appear most often CP=- .353 , p=.53) and including fixed effects CP=­
.385, p=.51) . But participation does increase strongly with rain CP=.69, p=.002 in the smaller sample 
with fixed effects) and weakly with high temperature CP=.014,p=.25) and weekdays CP=.258, p=.15) . 
So  our crude approach to participation is capable of detecting some effects, but does not find a 
correlation between median wage and participation. 
Income targeting 
A short time horizon is a necessary condition for a negative labor supply response to a 
transitory wage increase, but it is not sufficient. To explain why labor supply is downward sloping, 
and help explain why the elasticities are so large, we need to make more assumptions. 
The standard static model attributes downward-sloping labor supply to income effects. The 
essential insight of life-cycle models -- that short-term fluctuations in earning produce only small 
consumption and wealth effects -- is correct. One day's super- or sub-normal earnings can have at 
best a minimal effect on a cab driver's consumption or total wealth, so it is unlikely that the standard 
account of labor supply, coupled with the assumption of short time horizons, is sufficient to explain 
why wage elasticities are so large in magnitude. Put differently, even with a short horizon, drivers 
would have to be extremely risk-averse toward daily income risk for their wage elasticities to be so 
negative . 
One explanation for the large negative wage elasticities is that cab drivers establish a daily 
target income and quit once this target has been reached. (Indeed, our study was initially motivated 
when some drivers told us about this rule.) Income-targeting can be interpreted psychologically and 
captured analytically . 
Psychological interpretations : There are several reasons why cab drivers might supply labor 
to achieve a target wage. Our data cannot distinguish among these underlying reasons, but we 
present them because the idea is relatively new to labor economics, so a brief discussion might inspire 
further tests . 
First , income-targeting is a simple decision rule.  It requires drivers to simply count the 
income they have earned and quit when the total hits the target. This is surely easier to implement 
than the steady delicate balance of marginal income utility, expected wage, and foregone leisure 
utility, which is assumed by dynamic labor models. 
Second, income-targeting simplifies the cognitive task of meeting one's spending needs and 
smooths income (sacrificing some mean level of salary for a reduction in variance) . Having a steady 
income vastly simplifies financial planning, from deciding how much rent or groceries one can afford, 
to making sure one saves enough to pay the bi-yearly tuition bill . 
Such an account might help to explain the finding that more experienced drivers have less 
negatively sloped labor supply curves than less experienced drivers. If drivers income target because 
it is a simple heuristic to use, they may learn over time that an equally simple rule is to drive the same 
number of hours every day (or better, to substitute positively) and those new rules will produce more 
income without raising the total number of hours worked. 
Third, while cognitive limits can explain income targeting, they do not explain why people 
target over such a short time horizon. Given the low correlation of wage across days, incorne­
targeting with a target interval of one week would also guarantee regular weekly income and allow 
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substitution across days which would raise total leisure and income. 
But targeting over a longer horizon requires more self-control. Given the tediousness of 
driving, drivers face an enormous temptation to quit early on any given day. With a weekly income 
target (particularly one in which the weekly interval shifted continuously in time), it is easier to justify 
quitting early one day, with the expectation of making up the foregone earnings later in the week. 
A daily target wage limits temptation by providing a "bright line" rule (Hersh Shefrin & Thaler, 1992) 
which is less vulnerable to self-deception. 
The bright-line argument assumes impatient drivers will consume too much leisure. Another 
self-control problem arises from the difficulty of saving. Substituting intertemporally requires drivers 
to save the large amount of cash they earn from driving long hours on a high-wage day, to finance 
consumption on a low-wage day in which they quit early . Driving home through Manhattan with a 
couple of hundred dollars from a good day takes a driver past many temptations ; anticipating their 
inability to resist, drivers may not bother to exceed their target on high-wage days and hence, cannot 
achieve a weekly or monthly target. 
Analytical interpretation: If drivers do establish a daily income target, this leaves open the 
question of how such a target influences behavior and how to model it analytically . 
An income target is probably not perfectly binding. (The fact that drivers can be bribed from 
going off-duty, as one of us has done, shows that the target constraint is soft, not hard. )  Instead, we 
think a daily income target serves as a "reference point" in the driver's utility function for earnings. 
Many studies of individual decision-making show that the judged utility of outcomes depends on the 
difference between the absolute level of the outcome and a point of reference. A further assumption, 
supported by considerable research, 13 is that utility functions exhibit "loss aversion" (Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky 1979; Tversky & Kahneman 1991)-- losses from a reference point 
produce more disutility than the utility of equal-sized gains. Applied to labor supply, loss-aversion 
implies that drivers will act like progressing toward an income target yields substantially more utility 
than exceeding it. 
More formally, a utility function u(y,t) over income y with target t exhibits loss-aversion if 
the increasing-loss derivative u'(y,t) at y<t is strictly greater than the increasing-gain derivative at y>t 
(see David Bowman et al, 1994) .  Defined this way, loss-aversion is equivalent to a "kink" or point 
of non-differentiability at the reference point t. A kink at t means that when the daily income reaches 
t, the substitution effect of a change in wages is exactly zero14 ; then even a small income effect 
13 Evidence of loss-aversion is plentiful in decision making under risk (Daniel Kahneman & 
Amos Tversky 1979), consumer choice and "endowment effects " (Kahneman, Jack Knetsch & 
Thaler 1990),  contingent values to buy and sell non-market goods and "status quo biases" 
(William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser 1988) . In addition, models including loss-aversion 
have been used to explain naturally-occurring phenomena like the excess return of stocks over 
bonds (Shlomo Benartzi & Thaler, 1995) and asymmetric elasticities for price increases and 
decreases (Bruce Hardie, Johnson & Peter Fader 1993) and some anomalies in consumption­
savings patterns (David Bowman, Debby Minehart & Matthew Rabin, 1995 ; John Shea, 1995).  
14  In the standard (static) model with separability , leisure hours are chosen to make the 
marginal utility of foregone leisure u'(L) equal the marginal utility of foregone income wv'(y) , so 
w=u'(L)/v'(y) . With a kink at t, this equality becomes a pair of inequalities, 
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reduces labor supply. When daily income is at the target t, the labor supply curve is the hyperbola 
h=t/w, which has an elasticity (dh/dw)(w/h) of -1. Furthermore, while a differentiable utility function 
that is very concave around t can produce a negative elasticity too, a kink is probably the most 
plausible way to produce an elasticity as big as -1 . 15 
The target income hypothesis implies an elasticity of -1 around target. In many of the 
specifications (especially using IVs), this hypothesis cannot be rejected. Income targeting also implies 
the log hours-log wage relation is linear. But some of the data in Figure 2 suggest a nonlinear 
function (e.g . ,  a quadratic) may fit the data better than a linear one. 
Table 9 shows OLS regressions which include a squared log wage term. This quadratic form 
fits substantially better than the linear form reported in Table 3 (the adjusted R2's all increase) . The 
labor supply curve the estimated coefficients trace out is shown in Figure 4 for the TRIP sample. 
This labor supply curve looks remarkably like a traditional backward-bending labor supply curve in 
a static model. At low wages, wage increases produce substitution into more work, but as wages rise 
the income effect quickly dominates the substitution effect, leading to a decline in hours. 
The nonlinearity apparent in the Table 9 regressions and the Figure 4 plot rejects the strong 
form of the income target hypothesis which assumes a kink in the income utility function at the target. 
But without a kink (even assuming a one-day horizon) , the source of extreme risk-aversion which 
produces such a steep backward bend remains mysterious. Further research, drawing on the targeting 
interpretation or other plausible sources of extreme local risk-aversion, would be worthwhile. 
Finally, the idea of short horizon income targeting could also be usefully tested with a larger 
set of trip sheet data. Using a hazard specification, the probability that a driver quits for the day at 
any point in time can be parameterized as a function of the cumulated income and the expected 
marginal wage (given some specification of how wage expectations are formed) . Short-horizon 
targeting predicts quitting is related to cumulated same-day income. Conventional theory predicts 
quitting is only related to expected wages. 
w > u'(L)/v'/y) (for increases in income) 
w < u'(L)/v_'(y) (for decreases in income) 
where v'+(Y) and v_'(y) denote above- and below-t marginal utilities. Note that a kink in the utility 
function for income is formally similar to the idea that a nonlinear budget constraint can produce 
zero substitution. 
15 Assume a one-day horizon, no nonwage income, and an additively separable utility function 
v(y)+u(L) . Maximizing yields the wage equation w=u'(L)/v'(y) . Differentiating and rearranging 
terms gives the elasticity equation (dh/dw)(w/h)=( l -yry)/(yry+hrL) where ry=-v"(y)/v' (y) and rL=­
u"(L)/u'(L) are risk-aversion coefficients. If u(L) and v(y) are both concave, the wage elasticity is 
negative if and only if relative risk-aversion is greater than one (ry> l/y) . For example, logarithmic 
utility delivers a zero elasticity. A kink in u(y) means ry is negatively infinite around the kink, so 
the elasticity is -1 . Other utility functions either cannot produce large negative elasticities or have 
other odd properties. Large relative risk aversion (e.g . ,  power functions u(y)=-ya with a<O) allows 
negative elasticities but behave badly toward income gambles with low outcomes. (The certainty­
equivalent for an income gamble with any chance of zero income is zero.) Functions with 
constant absolute risk-aversion can generate negative elasticities, but they predict that labor 
supply increases when wages drop low enough (contrary to Figure 4 below) . 
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Could drivers earn more by driving differently? 
We can simulate how income would change if drivers changed their driving behavior. Using 
the TLC l data, we take the 234 drivers who had two or more days of data in our sample. For a 
specific driver i, call the hours and hourly wages on a specific day t, hit and wit• respectively, and call 
driver i's mean hours over all the days in the sample hi. By construction, the driver's actual total 
wages earned, Ei, in our sample is : 
E. 1 (1) 
A natural comparison is to ask how much money that driver would have earned if he had 
driven hi hours every day rather than varying the number of hours (i.e. if his labor supply curve of 
hours against wages was flat). Call this answer "fixed-hours earnings" :  
FHEi = L hi wit 
t (2) 
Is fixed hours earnings greater than actual earnings? We know that, on average, hit and wit 
are negatively correlated so that the difference between fixed hours earnings and actual earnings will 
be positive in general. On average, drivers would increase their net earnings by 5.0% (s.e.=.4%) if 
they drove the same number of hours (hi) every day, rather than varying their hours every day (but 
averaging hi across days). If we exclude drivers who would earn less by driving fixed hours (because 
their wage elasticity is positive), the improvement in earnings would average 7.8%. And if leisure 
utility is concave, fixed-hours driving will improve overall leisure utility too. 
These increases in income arise from following the simplest possible advice -- drive a constant 
number of hours each day. Suppose instead that we hold each driver's average hours fixed, but 
reallocated hours across days as if the wage elasticity was + 1. Then the average increase in gross 
income across all drivers is 10%. Across drivers who gain, the average increase is 15.6%. 
It is tempting to conclude from these calculations that on average, cab drivers are stupidly 
foregoing 8-15% of their annual income by working more on the wrong days. Such a conclusion 
would be premature because it depends on why drivers have negative wage elasticities. If this 
behavior is due to a heuristic shortcut, these gains represent the shadow price of "computational 
time". If it results from an attempt to avoid the temptation of repeatedly quitting early or squandering 
extra cash from high-wage days, then the lost wages reveal the price paid for self-control. 
Aggregate labor supply consequences 
A natural question arises about the aggregate labor supply of drivers, and the market equilibria 
that result, under the standard theory and the observed empirical results. In both cases, assume 
exogenous shifts in demand from day to day, which are partly predictable (e.g., weekdays have higher 
demand than weekends, and rain or snow raises demand) .  Aggregate labor supply is determined by 
the number of drivers who choose to drive on a day, and the number of hours they drive. If the wage 
elasticity is positive, drivers will substitute into high-demand days, depressing the wage on those days 
and all drivers may choose to work longer hours on high-demand days. If enough drivers are flexible, 
and demand shifts are uncorrelated with other effects on labor supply, then increased supply will drive 
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wages to be equal across days. 
However, if the wage elasticity is negative, on high-demand days high wages will cause 
drivers to quit early, drawing the supply curve inward and sustaining the high wage. On low-demand 
days drivers will work longer, depressing the wage. A negative wage elasticity is disequilibrating, 
creating persistent wage differences across days. 
Since there does appear to be wage variation across days, systematic variation is consistent 
with the aggregate supply implications of a negative wage elasticity . However, predictable wage 
differences can also result if demand shifts are correlated with supply curve shifts. Some forces 
would seem to shift demand and supply in the same direction, causing large interday wage variations 
(e.g . ,  a national holiday could cause both a surge in demand and an increased taste for leisure among 
drivers, raising the supply curve) . Other forces will push in opposite directions and dampen wage 
swings (e.g . ,  demand increases on a rainy day, when drivers don't mind working) . 
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Dynamic theories of labor supply predict a positive labor supply response to transitory 
fluctuations in wages. Previous studies have not been able to measure this elasticity precisely, and 
the measured sign is often negative, contradicting the theoretical prediction. These analyses, 
however, have been plagued by a wide variety of estimation problems -- most notably the absence 
of direct measures of many key variables such as future wage expectations . 
Many of these estimation problems are avoided by estimating labor supply functions for taxi 
drivers, a subset of the population which faces wages that are highly correlated within days, but only 
weakly correlated between days. Despite the major difference in methodology, our results lend 
further support to the frequent finding of negative elasticities for transient changes in wages. In all 
three of our samples, wage elasticities are negative and significantly different from zero. When we 
use instrumental variables to correct for measurement error in wages, the estimated wage elasticity 
becomes even more negative (close to -1 ). Our results should reinforce existing doubts about the 
importance of long-term intertemporal substitution of labor and leisure for labor supply . 
Most obvious alternative explanations for the negative elasticities can not explain two other 
facts: Drivers who own their medallions exhibit negative elasticities (ruling out liquidity constraints) ; 
and more experienced drivers seem to have less negative elasticities, as if they gradually shift their 
behavior to conform to the standard theory. The explanation we prefer is that drivers take a short 
time horizon and do not intertemporally substitute hours from one day to another. Furthermore, they 
are quite risk-averse toward daily income risk, consistent with a decision rule in which they fix an 
income target and quit when they reach the target. 
Given the striking discrepancy between the theoretical predictions of the life-cycle model and 
the actual behavior of New York City taxi drivers, it is tempting to conclude that cab driver labor 
supply is not representative of the general population. The drivers in our sample certainly are not 
demographically representative of the general population (they are disproportionately male, and 
recently immigrated) but they are probably not as different as one might expect. Many older cab 
drivers own houses and have families, while many younger ones are working their way through 
college or vocational training. 
Whether New York drivers are demographically unusual or not, the distinctive features of 
their labor supply decision is that they pay a fee every day for the right to work, have flexible self­
determined hours, and get paid immediately in cash. In other occupations with some of these features-
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- like farming, fishing, and sales 16-- working toward a daily income target may be quite natural and 
is worth exploring further. 
Final comments 
The analyses we report exemplify two recent trends within economics.  First, as part of a 
broader project in "behavioral economics" ,  work like ours strives to draw inspiration for economic 
theorizing from other social sciences, particularly psychology, while respecting the twin aesthetic 
criteria that characterize post-war economics : models should be formal and make field-testable 
predictions. The goal is to demonstrate that economic models with better roots in psychology can 
both create interesting challenges for formal modelling, and also make better predictions.  
Second, a growing number of economists have begun to question the benefits of increasing 
sophistication in mathematical models .  In game theory, theorists and experimenters have shown that 
simple evolutionary and adaptive models of behavior can often explain behavior better than 
sophisticated equilibrium concepts (e.g . ,  John Gale, Kenneth Binmore, and Larry Samuelson, 1995) . 
Experimental economists have noted how "zero intelligence" programmed agents can approximate 
the surprising allocative efficiency of human subjects in double auctions (Dan Gode and Shyam 
Sunder, 1993), and how demand and choice behavior of animals duplicates patterns seen in empirical 
studies of humans (John Kagel, Raymond Battalio, and Leonard Green, 1995) . Our research, too, 
shows that relatively simple principles and models can often go a long way toward explaining and 
predicting economic behavior, and even outperform more sophisticated models that assume too much 
rationality on the part of economic agents . 
16 For example, workers who sell beer at baseball games pay a fixed fee for the right to sell 
beer, keeping all the profit. 
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Appendix 
Details of Samples and Data Screens 
Data Set 1: TRIP 
This data starts out with 192 trip sheets from April 24, 1994 to May 14, 1994 . There are 27 
cab drivers in the data, 18 of which appear more than once in the data. 
The screen used eliminates all trip sheets where the number of trips recorded on the meter is 
more than two trips greater than the number listed by the driver. This reduces the number of trips 
from 192 to 70 . The number of drivers is reduced to 13, 8 of which appear more than once in the 
data. 
Data set 2: TLC l 
This data starts out with 1719 trip sheets without missing data from October 1 ,  1990 to 
December 2, 1990. We use a screen the TLC used to exclude 654 observations .  Their screen uses 
only trip sheets with a close match to the number of recorded trips to the metered number, a fraction 
of "live miles" carrying passengers (as a fraction of the number of miles driven, recorded from the 
ca:b's odometer) between 20 and 80%, and other criteria. Using this screen yields 1065 observations , 
leaving us with 484 drivers, 234 of which appear more than once. 
Data Set 3: TLC2 
This data set starts out with 750 trip sheets without missing data or obviously implausible 
driving hours (negative) . There is only one observation for each driver, mostly from November 2 ,  
1988 (there are some additional trip sheets from several days around this date) . We use a screen 
derived by the DOT that drops 38 trip sheets , leaving 712 observations . 
Some additional details came from the NYC Taxi & Limousine Commission (1991, 1992) and from
Bruce Schaller (personal communication) . 
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TRIP 
Hours Worked 
Average Wage 
Total Revenue 
S ample Size 
TLC l 
Hours Worked 
Average Wage 
Total Revenue 
S ample Size 
TLC2 
Hours Worked 
Average Wage 
Total Revenue 
S ample Size 
Table 1 .  S ummary Statistics
Mean 
9 . 1 6
1 6.9 1 
1 52.70 
70 
9 . 6 1  
1 6.6 1 
1 54.3 1 
1 065 
9 . 3 8  
1 4.70 
1 33 . 3 8  
7 1 2 
Median 
9 . 3 8  
1 6 .20 
1 54.00 
9.68 
1 6.27 
1 53 .00 
9 .25 
14 .7 1 
1 37.23 
Std.  Dev 
1 .39  
3 .2 1 
24.99 
2 .86 
4 .34 
45.65 
2 .96 
3 .20 
40.74 
TLC l 
Low Hours 
High Hours 
Low Hours 
High Hours 
Low Hours 
High Hours 
Table 2 .  Relationship Between Wages and Hours 
Low Wage 
1 5  
High Wage 
20 
2 1  1 4  
X2=2.06, p=. 1 50 
Low Wage High Wage 
324 209 
324 208 
X2=50. l 0, p=.000
Low Wage High Wage 
207 1 54 
204 1 47 
X2= 1 7 .02, p=.000 
Note : observations are divided using a median split on wages and hours . 
Table 3 .  Estimated Wage Elasticities 
Sample TRIP TLC l TLC2 
Wage Elasticity - .4 1 1 - . 1 86 - . 503 - .64 1 - . 3 55  
( .097) ( . 1 29) ( .03 8) ( .05 1 ) ( .05 1 ) 
High .000 - .000 .00 1 . 002 - .02 1 
( .002) (. 002) (. 002) ( .002) ( .007) 
Rain . 002 . 0 1 5 - . 1 50 
( .039) ( .035) ( . 062) 
Week - .057 - .047 - .004 . 04 1  
( .03 8) ( . 033) ( .035) ( .043) 
Shift - .048  . 049 .050 .202 - .253 
( .039) ( .049) ( .025) ( .044) ( .03 8) 
- .057 - .059 
( .029) ( .055) 
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No 
Adjusted R2 .243 .486 . 1 64 349 . 1 46 
Sample Size 70 65 1 065 794 7 1 2  
Number of Drivers 1 3 8 484 234 7 1 2  
Note: standard errors are in parentheses. 
Table 4 .  Estimated Wage Elasticities (IV) 
Sample TRIP TLC l TLC2 
Wage Elasticity - . 364 - . 326 - . 805 - . 583  - 1 . 1 0 1  
( . 1 86) ( . 3 87) ( .272) ( . 306) ( .499) 
High . 000 - . 000 .00 1 .002 - .022 
( .002) ( . 002) ( .002) ( .002) ( . 008) 
Rain - . 003 . 027 - . 1 26 
( .042) ( .047) ( . 072) 
Week - .055  - .05 1 - .0 1 0  . 042 
( .03 8) ( .036) ( .036) ( .043) 
Shift - .053  .059 . 028 .205 - . 1 9 1
( .044) ( . 056) ( .033 )  ( .048) ( . 059) 
- .056 - .063 
( .03 0) ( .058)  
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No 
Adj usted R2 .240 .474 . 1 1 5 . 347 * 
Sample Size 70 65 1 065 794 7 1 2  
Number of Drivers 1 3 8 484 234 7 1 2  
Note : standard errors are in parentheses. Instrument is the median wage o f  other drivers on same 
day and shift. Adjusted R2 for 2SLS can lie outside of the interval [0, 1 ] .  
First Stage Regressions 
Sample TRIP TLC I 
Median Wage of . 794 . 9 1 9  
TLC2 
.905 
other drivers ( . 1 32) ( . 1 2 1 )  ( .206) 
Adjusted R2 . 3 38  .05 1 .025 
Sample Size 70 1 065 7 1 2  
Sample 
Table 5a. Estimated Wage Elasticities by Driver Experience Level 
TRIP 
Experience Level Low High Low High Low 
Wage Elasticity - . 774 - . 1 96 - . 508  .00 1 - .43 8 
( . 1 23 )  ( . 1 57) ( . 1 7 1 )  ( . 1 77) ( .07 1 )  
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No 
Adjusted R2 . 66 1 - .02 1  .797 .026 . 1 89 
Sample Size 29 4 1  26 39 320 
F Test for difference p=.000 p=.023 
Table 5b.  Estimated Wage Elasticities by Driver Experience Level 
TLC l Data 
Experience Level Low High Low High 
Wage Elasticity - . 522 - .497 - . 5 55  - .74 1  
( .053)  ( .053)  ( .07 1 )  ( .073) 
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
Adj usted R2 . 1 73 . 1 73 . 303 . 3 82 
S ample S ize 498 567 3 3 6  458 
F test for difference . 998 .050  
TLC2 
High 
- .22 1 
( .077) 
No 
.09 1 
375  
p= .059  
Note : standard errors are in parentheses.  All regressions also include measures of the weather and shift 
as explanatory variables. 
Sample 
Table 6a. Estimated Wage Elasticities by Driver Experience Level (IV) 
TRIP 
Experience Level Low High Low High Low 
Wage Elasticity - . 843 .288  - 1 . 063 .023 - 1 . 3 1 0 
( .22 1 )  ( . 553 )  ( .723)  ( . 504) ( .750) 
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No 
Adjusted R2 . 656 * . 683  . 025 * 
Sample S ize 29 4 1  26 39  320  
Table 6b. Estimated Wage Elasticities by Driver Experience Level (IV) 
TLC l Data 
Experience Level Low High Low High 
Wage Elasticity - . 72 1 - . 832  - . 726 - .455 
( . 370) ( . 390) ( . 592) ( . 35 1 )  
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 . 1 49 . 1 1 3 .285 . 3 52 
Sample S ize 498 567 3 3 6  458  
TLC2 
High 
- .43 1 
(3.W4) 
No 
* 
3 7 5  
Note : standard errors are in  parentheses. Instrument is the median wage of other drivers on same day 
and shift .  The regressions also include measures of the weather and shift as explanatory variables. 
Adjusted R2 for 2SLS can lie outside of the interval [0, 1 ] .
Type of Cab 
Wage Elasticity 
Fixed Effects 
Adj usted R2 
Sample Size 
F Test for difference 
Table 7. Estimated Wage Elasticities by Ownership 
TLC l  Data 
Fleet Lease Owned Fleet Lease 
- .43 8 - .4 1 9  - . 554 - . 524 - . 5 38  
( . 045) ( .065) ( .077) ( .086) ( . 072) 
No No No Yes Yes 
.2 1 2 . 1 68 .2 1 3  . 3 82 . 3 87  
3 7 1  3 76 3 1 8 1 50 3 3 9  
p= .099 p=. 063 
Owned 
- .734 
( .089) 
Yes 
. 3 66 
305  
Note : standard errors are in parentheses. Fleet cabs are rented daily, leased cabs are rented by 
the week or month, and owned cabs are owned by the drivers .  The regressions also include 
measures of the weather and shift as explanatory variables. 
Table 8 .  Estimated Wage Elasticities by Payment Structure (IV) 
Type of Cab Fleet Lease Owned Fleet Lease Owned 
Wage Elasticity - . 590 - .706 - . 80 1 - . 1 72 - .422 - . 5 1 7  
( . 1 76) ( .707) ( .687) ( .259) ( . 508) ( . 747) 
Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 . 1 87 . 1 24 . 1 87 .260 . 379 . 349 
Sample S ize 3 7 1  3 76 3 1 8 1 50 3 3 9  3 0 5  
Note : standard errors are i n  parentheses. Instrument i s  the median wage o f  other drivers on 
same day and shift. Adjusted R2 for 2SLS can lie outside of the interval [0, 1 ] .  Fleet cabs are
rented daily, leased cabs are rented by the week or month, and owned cabs are owned by the 
drivers . The regressions also include measures of the weather and shift as explanatory 
variables. 
Table 9 .  Non-Linear Labor Supply Curves 
Sample TRIP TLC l TLC2 
Log Wage 6 . 1 64 4 .405 . 8 36  . 7 1 9  .663 
(2 .007) (2 .284) ( . 308) ( .3 8 1 ) ( .343)  
Log Wage2 - 1 . 1 55 - . 825  - .250 - .252 - .2 1 5  
( . 3 52) ( .4 1 0) ( .057) ( .070) ( . 072) 
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No 
Adjusted R2 . 343 . 5 1 4  . 1 78 . 362 . 1 56 
Sample Size 70 65 1 065 794 7 1 2  
Number of Drivers 1 3 8 484 234 7 1 2  
Note : standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions include measures of the weather and shift 
as explanatory variables.
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Figure 4 :  Quadra t i c  regre s s ion o f  log (wag e )  on l o g (hours ) ( Tab l e 9 )  
